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WHAT IS “APPROPRIATE” 
LEGISLATION?: MCCULLOCH V. 
MARYLAND AND THE REDUNDANCY OF THE 
RECONSTRUCTION AMENDMENTS 
Franita Tolson* 
I am thankful for the opportunity to review Professor David 
Schwartz’s really thoughtful and incisive critique of McCulloch 
v. Maryland.1  The book is a creative and masterful
reinterpretation of a decision that I thought I knew well, but I
learned a lot of new and interesting facts about McCulloch and
the (sometimes frosty) reception that the decision has received
over the course of the last two centuries.  Professor Schwartz
persuasively argues that modern views of McCulloch as a
straightforward nationalist decision that has always had a storied
place in the American constitutional tradition are flat-out wrong.
The Spirit of the Constitution shows that the meaning of
McCulloch and its use as precedent by both the Supreme Court
and Congress has been much more fraught and complex than the
scholarly literature has appreciated.
For this symposium, I would like to focus my comments on 
Professor Schwartz’s views regarding the relationship between 
the Necessary and Proper Clause and the enforcement provisions 
of the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments.  
According to Professor Schwartz, very few representatives in the 
Reconstruction Congress explicitly cited McCulloch to explain 
the meaning and scope of those provisions of the Reconstruction 
Amendments that give Congress the power to enforce their terms 
through “appropriate legislation.”  Subsequent to the adoption of 
the Amendments, however, many representatives argued that 
* Vice Dean for Faculty and Academic Affairs and Professor of Law, University of
Southern California Gould School of Law. 
1. DAVID S. SCHWARTZ, THE SPIRIT OF THE CONSTITUTION: JOHN MARSHALL AND 
THE 200-YEAR ODYSSEY OF MCCULLOCH V. MARYLAND (2019). 
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McCulloch’s holding regarding the Necessary and Proper Clause 
was a proper interpretation of what constitutes “appropriate 
legislation” under the enforcement provisions.  Although the link 
between McCulloch and the enforcement provisions was not 
extensively debated during the ratification and adoption of the 
Reconstruction Amendments, Professor Schwartz argues that the 
issue of McCulloch’s influence on what is appropriate under the 
Reconstruction Amendments is “academic” because “[t]he 
Necessary and Proper Clause empowers congress [to] make 
‘necessary and proper’ laws to execute powers granted anywhere 
in the Constitution, not just the ‘foregoing powers’ in Article I, 
section 8.  It therefore applies to the enforcement provisions of 
the Reconstruction Amendments.”2  
The notion that the McCulloch standard applies to the 
enforcement provisions of the Reconstruction Amendments is a 
view that the Supreme Court had endorsed at one time,3 and that 
some scholars continue to endorse.4  Rather than viewing 
McCulloch as a guide to understanding what legislation is 
appropriate, however, Professor Schwartz instead applies the 
Necessary and Proper Clause to the Reconstruction Amendments, 
rendering Congress’s explicit power to enforce the Amendments 
through “appropriate legislation” redundant.  According to 
Professor Schwartz: 
[a]nyone who views McCulloch as the correct interpretation
of implied powers under the Necessary and Proper Clause
should therefore conclude that ‘the McCulloch standard’
governs the enforcement clauses of the Reconstruction
Amendments, whether or not the framers of those
amendments had McCulloch in mind.  The ‘appropriate
legislation’ tag is likewise immaterial, since the Necessary
and Proper Clause calls for appropriate implementing
legislation for all grants of legislative power.  As an
authoritative precedent interpreting the Constitution,
McCulloch was already constitutionalized.5
2. Id. at 129.
3. South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 326-27 (1966).
4. Franita Tolson, The Constitutional Structure of Voting Rights Enforcement, 89
WASH. L. REV. 379, 428-29 (2014). 
5. SCHWARTZ, supra note 1, at 129.
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Instead, Professor Schwartz attributes the need for 
enforcement provisions written into the Reconstruction 
Amendments as “demonstrat[ing] McCulloch’s lack of influence 
on the Supreme Court at that time” and the Reconstruction 
Congress’s fear of “states’-rights backsliding by the Court in 
reviewing Reconstruction enforcement legislation.”6   
While I agree with Professor Schwartz that these 
considerations undoubtedly motivated the Reconstruction 
Congress’s decision to include enforcement provisions in the 
Amendments, I nonetheless resist his characterization of the 
relationship between these provisions and the Necessary and 
Proper Clause.  Even if Congress legitimately feared an 
unsympathetic Supreme Court, there are two problems with an 
argument about the relationship between the Necessary and 
Proper Clause and the enforcement provisions of the 
Reconstruction Amendments that would render the latter 
redundant as a practical matter.   
First, the presence of an enforcement mechanism within a 
particular constitutional provision helps illuminate the 
provision’s scope and meaning, which is not necessarily true 
when Congress turns to the Necessary and Proper Clause as a 
supplement.  The Reconstruction Amendments not only contain 
open-ended terms like due process, equal protection, and right to 
vote, but Congress’s power to enforce their terms is substantively 
different from other grants of legislative authority that the 
Necessary and Proper Clause explicitly supplements, such as the 
Commerce Clause. 
Take, for example, Section 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment.  
One may view Section 2, which allows Congress to reduce a 
state’s delegation in the House of Representatives for abridging 
the right to vote, as a clear rule.  But the language of Section 5 of 
the Fourteenth Amendment, the terms of which give Congress the 
power to enforce all of the Amendment’s substantive provisions 
through “appropriate legislation,” suggests that the language of 
6. Id. at 130.
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Section 2 might be more of a standard than a rule.7  Section 2’s 
reference to the “right to vote” incorporates the laws of fifty 
different state constitutions setting out voter qualification 
standards, suggesting that “appropriate legislation” might require 
something other than enforcing the penalty.  Section 2, already 
expansive because what constitutes an abridgment or denial is not 
limited by considerations of race or partisanship, also became 
substantially broader after the Supreme Court determined that the 
Equal Protection Clause required that the right to vote under state 
law comport with new federal constitutional requirements.  
Section 1’s prohibition on poll taxes, for example, automatically 
means that the poll tax is a practice that abridges or denies the 
right to vote under Section 2.8  Likewise, an unreasonable 
residency requirement, found to be a violation of Section 1, 
similarly abridges the right to vote under Section 2.9  Finally, in 
thinking through the range of appropriate penalties to address 
these violations, Congress can abrogate state sovereign immunity 
under the Reconstruction Amendments even if it cannot do so 
under the Commerce Clause.10   
Thus, one cannot consider the scope of Congress’s authority 
to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment, particularly with respect 
to voting rights, without viewing that provision through the lens 
of Congress’s authority to enforce all of its moving parts.  The 
presence of Section 5 not only facilitates this analysis but 
encourages it.  Rather than the phrase “appropriate legislation 
reflect[ing] a type of redundancy to underscore a quality 
presumed to be inherent in the modified noun,” as Professor 
Schwartz contends, the addition of the “appropriate legislation” 
language is a more specific signal about what is “appropriate” for 
purposes of the Fourteenth Amendment.11  In this context, 
“appropriate” legislation to enforce Section 2 might be penalties 
other than reduced representation to further the aims of both 
Sections 1 and 2.  This conclusion might be less apparent if one 
7. See Franita Tolson, What is Abridgment? A Critique of Two Section Twos, 67 ALA.
L. REV. 433, 457-58 (2015).
8. See Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 666 (1966).
9. See Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 334-336 (1972).
10. See Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 55-59 (1996).
11. SCHWARTZ, supra note 1, at 126.
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had to rely on the Necessary and Proper Clause alone, which does 
not invite this sort of granular, intra-textual analysis.  The 
presence of Section 5 helps illuminate the relationship between 
the provisions—and congressional power to enforce them—
within the four corners of the Fourteenth Amendment.  
Second, the other risk of viewing the enforcement provisions 
as redundant is that it obscures that the Necessary and Proper 
Clause is not only about enlarging the scope of a specific 
enumerated power, but the Clause also provides a link between 
enumerated powers.  In McCulloch, Chief Justice Marshall found 
that Congress had broad authority to charter a bank when acting 
pursuant to its enumerated powers.  But he comes to this 
conclusion without specifying the degree to which each power 
that he identified—Congress’s ample authority “to lay and collect 
taxes; to borrow money; to regulate commerce; to declare and 
conduct a war; and to raise and support armies and navies”—was 
the basis for the constitutionality of the bank.  Professor Schwartz 
emphasizes that McCulloch was vague about which enumerated 
power justified the chartering of a Bank, holding only that the 
Necessary and Proper Clause enlarges the means that Congress 
can adopt to enforce a specific enumerated power.  In his view, 
“McCulloch is conventionally read to mean that an implied power 
must be derived from specified enumerated powers, but Marshall 
never clearly identified the enumerated powers from which he 
derived the implied power to incorporate a bank.”12   
But it is entirely possible that all of the powers that Chief 
Justice Marshall listed served as predicate authorities for the 
Bank.  Just as the enforcement provisions can serve as mini-
Necessary and Proper Clauses for each Reconstruction 
Amendment, shedding light on the relationship between 
provisions within a clause, the Necessary and Proper Clause of 
Article I can serve as the glue between constitutional provisions, 
justifying the aggregation of constitutional power arising from 
multiple sources of authority to enact much needed legislation.  
Thus, legislation that is an appropriate exercise of power under 
multiple provisions, as in the case of the Bank of the United 
States, is not necessarily appropriate when Congress seeks to 
12. Id. at 49.
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advance the same legislation pursuant to just one source of power.  
In other words, McCulloch is a Commerce Clause case as well as 
a Taxing and Spending case, a War Powers case, and so on, and 
the Bank is a necessary and proper means of advancing all of 
these powers, collectively.   
This view of the Necessary and Proper Clause is consistent 
with Congress’s practice of sometimes aggregating its authority, 
relying on not one, but multiple sources of power to enact 
legislation.  The Court has, on occasion, been deferential to 
Congress in these circumstances, even if Congress was not always 
explicit about the constitutional authority pursuant to which it was 
acting.  In Katzenback v. Morgan, for example, the Court upheld 
Section 4(e) of the Voting Rights Act, which prohibits literacy 
tests as a precondition for voting as applied to individuals from 
Puerto Rico who have completed at least the sixth grade, as an 
appropriate exercise of Congress’s authority to enforce the 
Fourteenth Amendment.13  The Court sustained Congress’s ban 
on literacy tests, even though an earlier court decision found these 
tests to be constitutional as a general matter, and Congress made 
no evidentiary findings that literacy tests were being used in a 
racially discriminatory manner.  The Court was willing to defer 
to Congress because of the myriad provisions that the Court 
identified as potential sources of authority for section 4(e)—
ranging from the treaty power to the Territorial Clause of Article 
III—even though Congress did not explicitly rely on any of these 
provisions in enacting the legislation.   
At the very least, Katzenbach illustrates that the presence of 
multiple sources of constitutional support has some relevance to 
the inquiry into the scope of congressional power, a position that 
received the Court’s full-throated endorsement in McCulloch v. 
Maryland and later, the Legal Tender Cases.14  Had the Supreme 
Court continued to endorse this view of congressional power, one 
of its most controversial decisions would have arguably come out 
differently.  In Shelby County v. Holder, the Court, in invalidating 
Section 4(b) of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, focused on the 
question of whether the Act was an appropriate exercise of 
13. Katzenback v. Morgan 384 U.S. 641, 643-647 (1966).
14. Legal Tender Cases, 79 U.S. 457, 532-534 (1870).
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authority under the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments.  
Together, Sections 4(b) and 5 required certain jurisdictions with 
terrible voting rights records to preclear all changes to their 
election laws with the federal government before those changes 
could go into effect.  In assessing the legislative record, the Court 
concluded that Congress did not compile a legislative record of 
intentional discrimination sufficient to justify the coverage 
formula as appropriate legislation under these provisions.   
The Court ignored that the coverage formula arguably could 
have been sustained under some combination of the Fourteenth 
and Fifteenth Amendments and the Elections Clause, which 
allows Congress to regulate federal elections in the absence of 
intentional discrimination.15  Even if the power that Congress has 
to enforce each of these Amendments, standing alone, was 
insufficient to support the Act, the aggregate of these provisions, 
when combined with the Elections Clause, was more than 
sufficient to justify the scope of the coverage formula as a 
necessary and proper means of executing these powers.  As I have 
argued in prior work, the Elections Clause, unlike the Fourteenth 
and Fifteenth Amendments, is not constrained by federalism 
concerns and allows Congress to make or alter state legislation at 
will.16  The Court arguably could have conceived of the 
Necessary and Proper Clause as a link between the Elections 
Clause and the Reconstruction Amendments, an approach that 
would permit the Court to view congressional power over 
elections comprehensively and assess the legislative record in 
light of this broad authority.  
In conclusion, reading the Necessary and Proper Clause as a 
means of both furthering a specific enumerated power and 
allowing Congress to aggregate its authority under multiple 
clauses would solve a core problem presented by Professor 
Schwartz’s reading of the Reconstruction Amendments.  This 
interpretation acknowledges the unique relationship between the 
15. The Elections Clause, in its entirety, provides: “The Times, Places and Manner of
holding Elections for Senators and Representatives, shall be prescribed in each State by the 
Legislature thereof; but the Congress may at any time by Law make or alter such 
Regulations, except as to the Places of chusing Senators.” U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4, cl. 1.   
16. Franita Tolson, The Spectrum of Congressional Authority over Elections, 99 B.U.
L. REV. 317, 393 (2019).
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Amendments’ substantive and enforcement provisions that the 
Necessary and Proper Clause cannot adequately capture because 
the enforcement provisions themselves inform the meaning of the 
relevant substantive provisions.   
In addition, this approach reflects that the Clause has a 
broader purpose than simply furthering the scope of an 
enumerated power, a fact that gets lost when the Clause is blindly 
applied to all grants of legislative authority.  The Clause is also 
about the relationship across provisions, which is an extremely 
nationalistic interpretation that might also explain the Clause’s 
desuetude in the years following McCulloch.  The Chief Justice’s 
failure in McCulloch to indicate which of the aforementioned 
powers, standing alone, supported the Bank could be attributed to 
the fact that all of these enumerated powers, in the aggregate, 
served as the basis for Congress’s authority to charter the Bank.  
The Necessary and Proper Clause provides the link between these 
enumerated powers, broadening the universe of means that 
Congress can rely on to further these constitutionally endorsed 
ends.   
